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The Institutionalization
of Treasury Note and
Bond Auctions, 1970-75
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
ince 1976, the U.S. Treasury has financed the federal deficit,
and refinanced maturing debt, primarily with auction sales 
of bills, notes, and bonds. However, prior to 1970 the Treasury 
did not auction coupon-bearing securities. (It did auction bills, 
more or less as it does today.) Instead, it raised new cash, and 
refinanced maturing debt, with fixed-price subscription and 
exchange offerings of notes and bonds.
The substitution of market-driven auctions for fixed-price 
offerings between 1970 and 1975 was a milestone in the 
evolution of the Treasury market. However, the outcome of the 
effort was initially quite uncertain. The Treasury had tried 
twice before—in 1935 and 1963—to auction long-term bonds, 
but both attempts had failed. Although many observers 
believed that auctions would be a more efficient way to identify 
market-clearing prices, it was far from evident—especially in 
light of past experience—how to introduce successfully a 
program of regular auction sales.
This article examines the introduction of regular auction 
offerings of Treasury notes and bonds in the early 1970s. We do 
not take issue with the conventional wisdom that auctions are 
more efficient and less costly than fixed-price offerings. Rather, 
we seek to identify why the Treasury twice tried and failed to 
adopt the more efficient method but succeeded on its third 
attempt. We suggest that the success of the effort rested on 
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• Despite the appeal of auctions as an effective 
way to offer securities, the U.S. Treasury failed 
in its first two attempts, in 1935 and 1963, to 
introduce a program of regular auction sales 
of long-term bonds.
• That pattern changed between 1970 and 
1975, when the Treasury replaced its 
fixed-price offerings of notes and bonds 
with regular auctions—a practice that 
continues today.
• An analysis of the Treasury market suggests 
that the turnaround in the early 1970s owes to 
three key decisions: the Treasury closely 
imitated its successful and well-known bill 
auction process; it announced auctions for 
securities of gradually increasing maturity, 
rather than immediately auctioning long-term 
bonds; and it was willing to alter the auction 
process when improvements were called for.
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three pillars. First, the Treasury closely imitated its successful 
and well-known bill auction process. This strategy gave dealers 
a familiar starting point for developing the risk management 
and sales programs needed to support auction bidding for 
coupon-bearing securities. Second, the Treasury announced 
auctions for securities of gradually increasing maturity, rather 
than jumping immediately to auctioning long-term bonds, 
as it did in 1935 and 1963. This action allowed dealers an 
opportunity to build up their risk management and sales 
programs in an orderly fashion. Third, the Treasury 
demonstrated a willingness to alter the auction process when 
shortcomings appeared—rather than simply jettisoning the 
entire effort, as it did in 1935 and 1963. By combining 
familiarity, gradualism, and a willingness to improvise, the 
Treasury successfully moved the primary market for coupon-
bearing securities to a more efficient configuration.
The history of the Treasury’s attempts to institutionalize 
auction offerings of notes and bonds is important in its own 
right, but also for its larger implications. It suggests that the 
mere prospect of greater efficiency may not necessarily effect 
change that requires a large number of actors to alter familiar 
patterns of behavior; change sometimes also depends on 
following a path that facilitates learning and implementation of 
new patterns. The Treasury accomplished its objectives in the 
early 1970s because it gave dealers an opportunity to learn 
gradually about how to participate in note and bond auctions 
and because it was itself willing to learn from experience.
The article proceeds as follows. The next two sections set the 
stage by describing how the Treasury sold securities before 
1970: Section 2 looks at fixed-price offerings of notes and bonds 
and Section 3 explains how bills were auctioned. Section 4 
summarizes the debate over whether to auction coupon-
bearing securities—a debate that flared up in the late 1950s 
with Milton Friedman’s well-known criticism of fixed-price 
offerings. Section 5 describes the unsuccessful 1963 attempt to 
auction long-term bonds to competing syndicates of securities 
dealers. Section 6 relates the introduction of auction sales of 
notes and bonds in the early 1970s, and Section 7 shows how 
the Treasury fine-tuned the auction process in the mid-1970s.
2. Fixed-Price Offerings before 1970
Prior to 1970, the Treasury sold notes and bonds for cash in 
subscription offerings, and typically refinanced maturing notes 
and bonds by offering to exchange them for new notes and 
bonds.1 This section describes the two types of offerings and 
identifies their shortcomings.
2.1 Subscription Offerings
In a subscription offering, the Treasury set the maturity date 
and coupon rate of a new issue, announced how much of the 
security it wanted to sell, and invited public subscriptions at a 
fixed price. It typically announced that it would accept all 
subscriptions for amounts below some stated threshold and 
that it would allocate the remaining notes or bonds to larger 
subscribers in proportion to the amounts sought. For example, 
on July 31, 1968, the Treasury announced that it would sell 
approximately $5.1 billion of 5 5/8 percent notes maturing on 
August 15, 1974, at a price of 99.62 percent of principal. 
The subscription books would be open for a single day, on 
August 5; subscriptions for $250,000 or less would be filled in 
full and the notes would be issued on August 15. The Treasury 
received subscriptions for $23.5 billion—4.6 times the amount 
offered. Subscriptions for more than $250,000 were allotted 
18 percent of the amounts subscribed for, subject to a 
minimum allocation of $250,000.
Before setting the terms of an offering, Treasury officials 
consulted with banks, insurance companies, and securities 
dealers to assess the prospective demand for notes and bonds of 
different maturities and to identify the yield needed to sell a 
given amount of a particular issue.2 The Treasury set the coupon 
rate on a new issue to the nearest one-eighth of a percent below 
the intended offering yield and then reduced the offering price 
below 100 to fine-tune the yield to the desired level.3 A 
Treasury economist (Baker 1976, p. 147) observed that a debt 
manager “succeeded perfectly in his pricing effort if the volume 
of subscriptions . . . just cover[ed] the amount . . . offered.”
2.2 Drawbacks to Subscription Offerings
Friedman (1960, p. 65) characterized the process of setting the 
terms of an offering as “crystal gazing . . . and plain guesswork.” 
In setting terms, the Treasury bore the risk of misjudging 
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market demand. If it set the offering yield too low, the issue 
would be undersubscribed and the offering would fail. The risk 
of a failed offering was compounded by the possibility that 
market yields might rise between the time the Treasury 
announced a new issue and the time it opened the subscription 
books—usually an interval of several days to a week.4
To limit the likelihood of an undersubscribed offering, the 
Treasury added a premium to contemporaneous market yields 
when it set the terms of an offering.5 Friedman (1964, p. 513) 
noted that this premium sometimes led to unduly generous 
yields. Generous yields in turn led to substantial over-
subscriptions and low allotment ratios. Cecchetti (1988, 
pp. 1117-8) reports that the average allotment ratio between 
1932 and 1940 was 15.4 percent. Substantial oversubscriptions 
were clear signs that the Treasury was giving away yield at 
taxpayer expense. Not surprisingly, some market participants 
would subscribe for new issues and then seek to sell their 
allotments quickly at a premium to the subscription price. This 
practice, known as “free-riding,” was widely criticized because 
it hindered direct sales to final investors and was believed to 
contribute to price volatility.6
2.3 Exchange Offerings
In an exchange offering, the Treasury announced maturity 
dates and coupon rates for one or more new notes and/or 
bonds and invited the public to exchange one or more 
maturing issues for an equal principal amount of the new 
securities.7 For example, in the summer of 1970, the Treasury 
faced the imminent maturity on August 15 of $5.6 billion of 
notes and bonds. On July 29, it offered to exchange either a 
three-and-a-half-year note or a seven-year note for the 
maturing securities. Following the close of the offering, the 
Treasury announced that investors had tendered $4.8 billion 
(85 percent) of the maturing securities and had redeemed the 
balance ($0.8 billion). In exchange for the maturing debt, 
investors took $3.0 billion of the three-and-a-half-year notes 
and $1.8 billion of the seven-year notes.
To finance “attrition,” or cash redemption of unexchanged 
securities, the Treasury sometimes announced a cash 
subscription concurrently with an exchange offering. For 
example, when the Treasury announced the exchange offering 
described above, it also announced that it would sell 
$2.75 billion in eighteen-month notes “to pay for the August 15 
maturities not exchanged and to raise new cash.”8 At other 
times, the Treasury’s cash balances were large enough to fund 
the redemption of unexchanged securities.
2.4 Drawbacks to Exchange Offerings
In setting the terms of an exchange offering, the Treasury bore 
the risk that it might set the yields on its new issues too low and 
that investors would choose to redeem an unexpectedly large 
fraction of the maturing debt. This outcome could expose the 
Treasury to a cash-flow crisis as it scrambled to meet investor 
demands for cash redemption.9 As with subscription offerings, 
the risk of misjudging the market was compounded by the 
potential for market yields to rise between the time the 
Treasury announced the terms of an offering and the time 
the subscription books were opened. To limit the risk of an 
unexpectedly high attrition rate, the Treasury added a 
premium to contemporaneous market yields when it set the 
terms of an offering.10
A second problem with exchange offerings was that holders 
of maturing issues were not “natural” buyers of new issues with 
longer maturities. Accepting an exchange offer materially 
altered the risk exposure of the holder of a maturing issue. In 
any particular offering, some investors could be expected to be 
uninterested in such a sharp change in risk. Sophisticated 
holders who wanted cash sold their debt shortly before 
maturity, thereby capturing the exchange option value of the 
debt. This strategy, however, required the (costly) market-
making services of a securities dealer.11
Finally, because exchange offerings usually gave investors a 
choice of several different securities, the Treasury lost direct 
control of the maturity structure of its debt. For example, in the 
August 1970 exchange offering described earlier, investors 
could have opted for as much as $5.6 billion of the three-and-
a-half-year note (and none of the seven-year note), or as much 
as $5.6 billion of the seven-year note (and none of the three-
and-a-half-year note). The Treasury was prepared to 
accommodate either extreme, as well as any intermediate 
outcome. Gaines (1962, p. 79) noted that “In a very real sense, 
the maturity distribution of the debt was left in the hands of the 
investors.”12
In an exchange offering, the Treasury 
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3. Treasury Bill Auctions before 1970
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Treasury was auctioning 
bills even while it wrestled with the risks and uncertainties of 
fixed-price offerings of notes and bonds. By 1970, the Treasury 
was auctioning four different series of bills on a regular basis. 
Thirteen-week bills had been offered weekly since before 
World War II and a weekly offering of twenty-six-week bills 
was added in 1958. Year bills were first offered in 1959 on a 
quarterly basis, and then on a monthly basis beginning in 1963. 
Monthly offerings of nine-month bills were added in 1966.
Bill auctions before 1970 were much like the bill auctions of 
today. An investor could submit one or more competitive 
tenders or a single noncompetitive tender. A competitive 
tender specified a bid price (as a percentage of face amount) 
and the quantity of bills desired at that price.13 A noncom-
petitive tender specified only a quantity (limited to some 
specified maximum amount) and agreed to pay the average 
accepted competitive bid. The Treasury accepted all noncom-
petitive tenders for the full amount sought. Competitive 
tenders were accepted in order of declining bid price until the 
balance of the offering was accounted for. Tenders specifying 
prices in excess of the stop-out, or minimum accepted, price 
received the full amount sought and were invoiced at their 
respective bid prices.14 The remaining bills were distributed in 
proportion to the quantities sought among those who bid at the 
stop-out price.
4. The Debate over Whether
to Auction Notes and Bonds
The argument for auctioning notes and bonds was well-known 
by the early 1960s. Friedman (1960, pp. 64-5) had pointed out 
the practical difficulty of setting the yield on a new issue at a 
level where investors would buy the full amount offered but 
hardly any more. He recommended that the Treasury eliminate 
fixed-price offerings and sell all of its marketable debt through 
regularly scheduled public auctions.15
The most extensive defense of the Treasury’s reliance on 
fixed-price offerings came in testimony by Secretary of the 
Treasury Robert Anderson before the Joint Economic 
Committee in 1959 (Joint Economic Committee 1959a, 
pp. 1147-61). Anderson observed that bills had been sold at 
auction ever since they were introduced in 1929, that the 
Treasury had extended the auction method of sale to twenty-
six-week bills and year bills when those series were introduced, 
and he acknowledged (p. 1150) that bill auctions were “an 
efficient mechanism.” Anderson further acknowledged 
(p. 1148) that auction offerings of notes and bonds would 
“relieve [the Treasury] of a major responsibility in pricing and 
selling coupon issues” and noted that the Treasury had 
introduced auction offerings of year bills to reduce the quantity 
of one-year certificates of indebtedness that it had to price.
Nevertheless, Anderson argued that fixed-price offerings of 
notes and bonds were preferable to auction sales of those 
securities. His analysis rested on the premise that many of the 
small banks, corporations, and individuals who subscribed to 
fixed-price offerings did not have the “professional capacity” to 
bid in an auction. Lacking professional expertise, they were 
liable to either bid too high and pay too much or bid too low 
and be shut out, and therefore were likely to avoid note and 
bond auctions altogether and to buy new securities in the 
secondary market. Anderson suggested that the withdrawal of 
small investors from the primary markets for notes and bonds 
would have several adverse consequences:
1. Small investors would lose the opportunity to buy 
securities directly from the Treasury on the same terms as 
large investors.
2. The Treasury’s ability to distribute its debt as widely as 
possible would be impaired. (He characterized broad 
distribution as a “major objective” of Treasury debt 
management policy.)
3. Since relatively few market participants had the expertise 
to bid for notes and bonds, the auctions might not be 
competitive. Indeed, there might be so few bidders that 
auctions might fail from time to time. (The Treasury 
viewed this as a particular risk for long-term bonds.)
Anderson asserted (p. 1153) that “The present practice of 
offering [notes and bonds] at prices and interest rates 
determined by the Treasury . . . result[s] in an effective 
distribution of new . . . issues at minimum cost to the taxpayer.”
He also pointed out that the Treasury had tried auctioning 
long-term bonds in 1935. Between May and August of that 
year, the Treasury auctioned $500 million of thirteen- and 
twenty-five-year bonds in a series of five auctions (see the box 
for details). The auctions were generally successful but 
The failure of an auction offering of 
Treasury-guaranteed federal agency 
bonds in late August 1935 was widely 
noted and led the Treasury to abandon 
the auction method.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2004 33
investors and dealers expressed dissatisfaction with the auction 
process. In particular, the Treasury’s practice of announcing 
and holding auctions on short notice and on no regular 
schedule made participation risky for dealers, dealers believed 
the profit opportunities did not justify the risks of partici-
pation, and banks and investors outside of the largest financial 
centers were reluctant to participate because they believed the 
auctions favored market professionals.16 The failure of an 
auction offering of Treasury-guaranteed federal agency bonds 
in late August 1935 was widely noted17 and led the Treasury to 
abandon the auction method.18
Responding to Anderson’s analysis, Friedman (1960, 
pp. 64-5) noted that the analysis implicitly assumed that notes 
and bonds would be auctioned the same way as bills: in a 
The 1935 Bond Auctions
Between May and August 1935, the Treasury auctioned $200 million 
of thirteen-year bonds and $300 million of twenty-five-year bonds 
in five auctions of $100 million each. The auctions were part of a 
plan to move away from a debt management program of large 
quarterly financings and toward a program of selling smaller 
amounts in more frequent offerings.a (There is also some 
indication that the Treasury may have planned to replace large, 
infrequent, regularly scheduled subscription offerings with small, 
frequent, discretionary auction offerings in order to “time” 
offerings to when demand for Treasury securities was strong and 
to stay out of the market when demand was weak.b)
The table below shows the terms and results of the five auction 
offerings. The first offering was widely characterized as experi-
mental, although the Treasury was reported to be ready to use the 
auction method more frequently if the offering succeeded.c The 
auction attracted tenders for $270 million of bonds and was viewed 
as a modest success.d The next two auctions attracted greater 
interest. The Secretary of the Treasury was quoted as being “very 
pleased” with the second and characterized the third as “very 
satisfactory.” e The fourth offering fared a little worse than the 
second and third, and the fifth, in mid-August, received a distinctly 
less enthusiastic reception.f
a “Treasury Plans Large Refinancing,” New York Times, May 28, 1935, p. 39 (“[Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau] said that the plan
of issuing securities at only the quarterly financing periods of June 15, Sept. 15, Dec. 15 and March 15 had been abandoned and
the issues would be ordered when it appeared that the Treasury needed the money”).
b “Treasury Retains Bond Auction Plan,” New York Times, September 14, 1935, p. 14, and U.S. Treasury (1940).
c “Treasury Plans Large Refinancing,” New York Times, May 28, 1935, p. 39 (auction offering “a feeler”), and “A Treasury Experiment,”
New York Times, May 29, 1935, p. 20.
d “New Bond Bids Treble Offering,” New York Times, May 31, 1935, p. 25.
e “Subscriptions of $461,341,000 Are Received for $100,000,000 Offer of Treasury Bonds,” New York Times, June 28, 1935, p. 31,
and “New Federal Issue Subscribed 5 Times,” New York Times, July 19, 1935, p. 25.
f “Treasury Bond Sale Sets Premium Mark,” New York Times, August 2, 1935, p. 26, and “Bids Show Decline on Federal Bonds,”
New York Times, August 16, 1935, p. 23.
Auction Offerings of Treasury Bonds, 1935
 Auction Date Issue
Quantity Bid
(Millions of Dollars) Range of Accepted Prices Average Accepted Price
5/29 3 percent bonds of 6/15/48  270 103 1/32 to 103 26/32 103 4/32
6/26 3 percent bonds of 6/15/48 461 Not reported 103 18/32
7/17 2 7/8 percent bonds of 3/15/60 511 101 19/32 to 101 27/32 101 19/32
7/31 2 7/8 percent bonds of 3/15/60 321 101 7/32 to 101 24/32 101 18/32
8/14 2 7/8 percent bonds of 3/15/60 147 100 21/32 to 101 8/32 100 25/32
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York circulars (1935, various dates); New York Times (1935, various issues).
Notes: All five auctions were for $100 million principal amount of bonds, reopened bonds previously sold in subscription offerings,
and used a multiple-price format. Competitive bids below 100 and noncompetitive bids were not accepted.34 The Institutionalization of Treasury Note and Bond Auctions
multiple-price format, where a successful tender is invoiced at 
its bid price.19 (The 1935 bond auctions had used this format.) 
Friedman claimed (p. 64) that the multiple-price format 
established a “strong tendency for the [primary] market to be 
limited to specialists” and suggested that small investors would 
be more willing to participate if the Treasury adopted a single-
price format, where all accepted tenders pay the stop-out price.
Following Friedman’s suggestion for single-price auctions, 
the Treasury faced a choice among three methods for selling 
securities: fixed-price offerings (already used for notes and 
bonds), single-price auctions, and multiple-price auctions 
(already used for bills). Friedman’s principal point was that 
fixed-price offerings were inferior to either of the two auction 
alternatives.20 He recommended the single-price auction 
format in lieu of the multiple-price format primarily to counter 
the Treasury’s claim that small investors would not participate 
in auction offerings of notes and bonds.21
5. The 1963 Syndicate Auctions
In 1963, the Treasury tried to combine the benefits of an 
auction with a fixed-price format that would preserve direct 
participation by small investors. Emulating contemporary 
market practice in the sale of some municipal and power 
company bonds, it twice offered long-term bonds in all-or-
none auctions to syndicates of securities dealers, where the 
winning syndicate was required to reoffer the bonds to public 
investors on a fixed-price basis (at a price of the syndicate’s 
choosing). The Treasury hoped that moving the locus of 
bond pricing to competing dealer syndicates would enhance 
the efficiency of the primary market without jeopardizing 
the benefits of fixed-price offerings for small investors. It 
characterized the new program as a “trial” intended to “explore 
the practicality” of syndicate auctions for selling bonds “at the 
lowest possible interest cost.”22
The first offering of $250 million of thirty-year bonds on 
January 8, 1963, attracted bids from four syndicates; the second 
offering of $300 million of thirty-one-year bonds on April 9 
attracted three bids. Bidding was extraordinarily competitive. 
In both cases, less than 1 basis point separated the yield on the 
winning bid from the yield on the third-best bid. The Treasury 
stated that the results of the first auction were “highly 
satisfactory” and indicated that the auction “provided the base 
for the potential development of an important new instrument 
for debt management.”23
The first offering was also a success for the members of the 
winning syndicate: the public reoffering sold out within a 
matter of hours.24 The second reoffering, however, was not well 
received. Less than half of the issue was sold by the close of 
trading on the auction day and few, if any, additional bonds 
were sold before the winning syndicate disbanded in late 
April.25 Market participants suggested that a third offering 
would produce a wider distribution of bids than the first two 
and that participating syndicates were certain to try to protect 
themselves by building larger underwriting spreads into their 
bids.26 Robert Roosa, Treasury Under Secretary for Debt 
Management, remarked that the next auction offering was 
“a long time” off.27 The Treasury never again sold securities 
through syndicate auctions.
6. A Renewed Effort to Auction 
Coupon-Bearing Securities
After the demise of the 1963 attempt, the Treasury had twice 
tried to implement regular auction offerings of long-term 
bonds and had twice failed. Nevertheless, Friedman’s basic 
criticism, that fixed-price offerings were inefficient, remained.28 
The inefficiencies became more apparent as interest rate 
volatility increased in the mid- and late 1960s. As shown in the 
bottom panel of Table 1, the standard deviation of the daily 
change in yield on a five-year note increased from about 1 basis 
point in 1963 to almost 6 basis points in 1970. Volatility in the 
three-year and ten-year sectors increased similarly. Treasury 
officials recognized that heightened volatility increased the 
likelihood that a fixed-price offering might fail and increased 
the likelihood that the Treasury would overpay on a new issue 
(Baker 1979, p. 204). A Treasury economist later summarized 
why the Treasury found auctions increasingly attractive by the 
end of the 1960s (Baker 1979, p. 204): “Auction pricing . . . 
eliminated the awkward delays in pricing and subscribing for 
the issue, allowed the market itself to determine the price, and 
thus removed the Treasury from the necessity of having to 
guess the price and the likely course of the market until the 
financing was complete.”
In late 1970, the Treasury decided to try yet again to auction 
coupon-bearing debt on a regular basis, but this time it 
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designed the auctions to resemble its successful and widely 
accepted bill auctions. This decision gave dealers a familiar 
starting point from which to develop the risk management and 
sales programs needed to support auction bidding for notes 
and bonds. Additionally, the Treasury borrowed from its 
experience with introducing longer term bill auctions in 1958 
and 1959: it first auctioned short-term notes, then 
progressively longer notes and bonds. This sequencing gave 
dealers an opportunity to develop their risk management and 
sales programs gradually.
6.1 The November 1970 Refunding
The November 1970 refunding29 got off to an unexceptional 
start when the Treasury announced on October 22 that it was 
prepared to exchange either a three-and-a-half-year note or a 
five-and-three-quarter-year note for $6.0 billion of Treasury 
securities maturing on November 15. Following the close of the 
subscription books, the Treasury announced that investors had 
tendered $5.3 billion of the maturing securities, leaving 
$0.7 billion to be redeemed in cash. However, rather than 
financing the attrition with a subscription offering, the 
Treasury announced that it would auction $2.0 billion of 
6 3/4 percent eighteen-month notes.
The auction was held on November 5 and followed closely  
the format of a bill auction. In light of the failure of the 
syndicate auction scheme seven years earlier, the Treasury was 
careful to remind participants that it was not doing anything 
novel: “the use of the auction method of sale represents an 
adaptation of the technique used successfully for many years in 
marketing Treasury bills” and “bidding and other procedures 
[will] very closely follow the standard procedures used in 
regular Treasury bill auctions.”30 Auction participants could 
submit one or more competitive tenders or a single 
noncompetitive tender (limited to $200,000) that would be 
filled at the average accepted competitive bid. Competitive 
tenders had to specify a bid price of at least 99.76 percent of 
principal value and were accepted in order of declining price 
until all of the notes were accounted for or all of the tenders 
were filled. Tenders specifying bid prices in excess of the stop-
out price received the full amount sought and were invoiced at 
their respective bid prices. The remaining notes were 
distributed among those who bid at the stop-out price in 
proportion to the quantities sought. The Treasury 
characterized the auction as a “test,” part of a “continuing 
effort . . . to develop more efficient debt management 
techniques.”31
On November 6, the Treasury announced that it had 
received tenders for $5.2 billion of notes—2.6 times the 
amount offered. It accepted bid prices ranging from 100.93 
(to yield 6.09 percent) down to a stop-out price of 100.69 
(to yield 6.26 percent), where there was a 32 percent 
allocation. The average accepted competitive price was 
100.76 (to yield 6.21 percent).
Table 1
Level and Volatility of Treasury Yields, 1963-70
Year Three-Year Note Five-Year Note Ten-Year Bond
Average yield during calendar year (percent per annum)
1963 3.67 3.83 4.00
1964 4.03 4.07 4.19
1965 4.22 4.25 4.28
1966 5.23 5.11 4.93
1967 5.03 5.10 5.07
1968 5.68 5.70 5.64
1969 7.02 6.93 6.67
1970 7.29 7.38 7.35
Standard deviation of yield change over one business day (basis points)
1963 1.32 1.07 0.92
1964 1.43 1.07 0.84
1965 1.76 1.58 1.11
1966 4.59 3.59 3.24
1967 4.27 3.96 3.31
1968 4.66 4.16 3.34
1969 5.46 4.59 4.13
1970 6.44 5.89 5.53
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Federal Reserve
Statistical Release H.15 (various years).
In light of the failure of the syndicate 
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6.2 Subsequent Early Auctions
The Treasury followed up its successful auction of eighteen-
month notes with additional auction offerings, but it 
initially used auctions sparingly and only to sell short-term 
notes. This infrequent and limited use of the auction 
method contrasts sharply with the 1935 attempt, where five 
issues of thirteen- and twenty-five-year bonds were 
auctioned in a two-and-a-half-month interval, and with the 
1963 attempt, where two auctions of long-term bonds came 
only three months apart. As shown in Table 2, the second 
auction (of sixteen-month notes) took place in June 1971, 
more than seven months after the first auction, and the third 
auction (in August 1971) was another offering of eighteen-
month notes.
After the August auction, the Treasury increased the 
frequency and maturities of its auction offerings. By the end 
of 1971, it had conducted six successful auctions of notes 
maturing in as much as five years. The Under Secretary of the 
Treasury for Monetary Affairs, Paul Volcker, characterized 
auction sales of short- and intermediate-term coupon-
bearing debt as a “striking innovation” in debt management: 
“I cannot claim that the approach has yet been fully tested 
in adversity, but I can say it has met or surpassed every 
expectation so far, to the advantage of the Treasury and the 
market. I am confident it will pass further testing with larger 
amounts and longer maturities.”32
6.3 Pushing the Envelope
The Treasury continued to expand its use of auction sales in 
1972. As Table 3 shows, the Treasury auctioned midquarter 
refunding issues for the first time in May; in October, it 
began to auction two-year notes on a regular basis. (The 
latter was the first series of regular note offerings to be 
auctioned from inception.)
In late 1972, the Treasury announced the first auction 
offering of long-term bonds since 1963: $625 million of 
twenty-year bonds. In a striking departure from prior 
practice, it adopted the single-price format recommended 
by Friedman more than a decade earlier, observing that 
“This procedure will provide an incentive to bid at prices 
sufficiently high to be sure of awards, while also assuring 
Table 2
Auction Offerings of Treasury Notes, 1970-71 





Auction Date Issue Term (Billions of Dollars) (Percent)
11/5/70 6 3/4 percent notes of 5/15/72 Eighteen months 2.00 5.2 6.09 to 6.26 6.21
6/22/71 6 percent notes of 11/15/72 Sixteen months 2.25 4.0 5.71 to 6.05 6.00
8/5/71 6 1/2 percent notes of 2/15/73 Eighteen months 2.50 4.1 6.44 to 6.59 6.54
8/31/71 6 1/4 percent notes of 11/15/76 Five years, two months 1.25 3.4 5.92 to 6.02 5.98
10/15/71 5 7/8 percent notes of 2/15/75 Three years, four months 2.00 4.6 5.46 to 5.61 5.58
11/9/71 4 7/8 percent notes of 2/15/73 Fifteen months 2.75 4.0 4.79 to 4.96 4.91
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York circulars (1970-71, various dates).
The Treasury followed up its successful 
auction of eighteen-month notes with 
additional auction offerings, but it initially 
used auctions sparingly and only to sell 
short-term notes. 
In late 1972, the Treasury announced 
the first auction offering of long-term 
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each bidder that, if he bids at a price within the range of 
accepted prices, he will be awarded bonds at the same price 
as every other bidder.”33 In response to complaints that the 
single-price format would deprive dealers of an opportunity 
to buy bonds slightly cheaper than other auction partici-
pants, a Treasury official pointed out that “the objective is 
to encourage widespread and confident bidding,” and a 
“broader distribution of our securities. We’re appealing to a 
type of investor who will be able to bid what he thinks the 
bond is worth to him without worrying about whether 
somebody else may get it cheaper.”34 Over the next fifteen 
months, the Treasury offered long-term bonds in single-
price auctions five more times (Table 4). However, the 
single-price format never became popular with dealers. 
Henry Kaufman, a well-known economist at Salomon 
Brothers, stated that the single-price format “provides no 
incentives to . . . dealers to help in the distribution process.”35
7. Fine-Tuning the Auction Process
By mid-1973, auction sales of notes and bonds had replaced 
fixed-price offerings. The Treasury had not announced a 
subscription offering since August 1970 and the last mid-
quarter refunding to rely on an exchange offering was in 
February 1973. However, the form of the auction process did 
not remain unchanged, evolving first in response to the only 
outright failure of a Treasury auction offering and then to 
simplify and enhance the efficiency of the process.
Table 3
Auction Offerings of Treasury Notes and Bonds, 1972





Auction Date Issue Term (Billions of Dollars) (Percent)
3/28 5 7/8 percent notes of 5/15/75 Three years 1.75 3.8 5.69 to 5.80 5.78
5/2 4 3/4 percent notes of 5/15/73 One year 1.25 3.3 4.23 to 4.47 4.44
5/2 6 3/8 percent bonds of 2/15/82 Nine years, nine months 0.50 1.3 6.23 to 6.32 6.29
10/11 6 percent notes of 9/30/74 Two years 2.00 4.8 5.77 to 5.89 5.86
11/1 6 1/4 percent notes of 11/15/76 Four years 3.00 7.1 6.16 to 6.21 6.20
12/20 5 7/8 percent notes of 12/31/74 Two years 2.00 5.6 5.72 to 5.85 5.83
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York circulars (1972, various dates).
Table 4
Auction Offerings of Long-Term Treasury Bonds in a Single-Price Format, 1973-74
Quantity Offered Quantity Bid
Auction Date Issue Term (Billions of Dollars)
Yield
(Percent)
1/4/73 6 3/4 percent bonds of 2/15/93 Twenty years 0.63 1.7 6.79
5/2/73 7 percent bonds of 5/15/98 Twenty-five years 0.65 1.2 7.11
8/1/73 7 1/2 percent bonds of 8/15/93 Twenty years 0.50 0.3 8.00
10/31/73 7 1/2 percent bonds of 8/15/93 Nineteen years, nine months 0.30 1.3 7.35
2/7/74 7 1/2 percent bonds of 8/15/93 Nineteen years, six months 0.30 1.1 7.46
5/8/74 8 1/2 percent bonds of 5/15/94 Twenty-five years 0.30 0.9 8.23
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York circulars (1972-74, various dates).38 The Institutionalization of Treasury Note and Bond Auctions
7.1 A Failed Auction
The first setback in the Treasury’s third attempt to auction 
coupon-bearing securities on a regular basis occurred in the 
August 1973 refunding. To refinance $4.7 billion of maturing 
notes and bonds, the Treasury announced on July 25 that it 
would auction $2.0 billion of 7 3/4 percent four-year notes, 
$500 million of 7 1/2 percent twenty-year bonds, and 
$2.0 billion of thirty-five-day bills.
Fixed-income securities prices declined sharply in late July 
1973. Between July 16 and July 30, the yield on five-year notes 
rose from 7.21 percent to 7.80 percent and the yield on twenty-
year bonds rose from 7.21 percent to 7.56 percent. On July 31, 
the Treasury received tenders for only $2.1 billion of its new 
four-year notes, barely more than the amount offered. It 
accepted all bids above 99.01 (the lowest price it had said it 
would accept) and 75 percent of the bids at 99.01. On the 
following day, the auction of twenty-year bonds failed: the 
Treasury received public tenders for only $260 million of the 
bonds. It accepted all of the tenders submitted at or above 
95.05, the lowest price it had said it would accept. The balance 
of the offering went into “Government Accounts.”36
7.2 Modification of the Auction Process
The failure of the August bond sale did not deter the Treasury 
from continuing to auction securities, but it did lead to some 
important changes in auction procedures. Immediately after 
the failure, the Treasury began to announce the coupon rate 
on a forthcoming issue after the announcement of the issue 
itself and closer to the time of the auction. For example, on 
August 20, 1973, the Treasury announced that it would auction 
two-year notes on August 24, but it did not announce the 
coupon rate on the new notes until August 22. This action 
reduced (but did not eliminate) the likelihood that the 
Treasury would offer another bond with a substantially 
off-market coupon.
The Treasury continued to delay coupon announcements 
on new notes and bonds until September 1974, when—in a 
further modification of prior practice—it replaced bidding in 
terms of price (on a security with a specified coupon) with 
bidding in terms of yield (on a security with no specified 
coupon). In the new framework, competitive tenders were 
accepted in order of increasing yield until all of the securities 
not taken by noncompetitive bidders were accounted for. 
Following the auction, the Treasury set the coupon rate at the 
highest rate—in increments of one-eighth of a percent—that 
gave an average price on the accepted competitive tenders not 
greater than par. Each accepted tender was then invoiced at its 
own bid yield. Noncompetitive tenders were invoiced at the 
average accepted competitive price. The Treasury remarked 
that “The new bidding method will permit pricing close to par 
and eliminate the risk of setting a coupon which, because of a 
change in the market between the coupon announcement date 
and the auction date, would result, on the one hand, in a price 
so far above par as to discourage bidders or, on the other hand, 
result in a price so low that the sale would have to be 
canceled.”37
7.3 The End of Single-Price Auctions
In mid-1974, the Treasury switched its long-term bond 
auctions to a multiple-price format—thus putting all of its 
auctions in a common format. The Treasury did not state 
publicly the reason for the change. However, one money 
market newsletter reported at the time that “Debt managers 
found no evidence that [the single-price format] was attracting 
enough additional or different bidders for the bonds to make 
its use worthwhile.”38 Under Secretary of the Treasury for 
Monetary Affairs, Jack Bennett, subsequently stated that “The 
Secretary of the Treasury at that time, William E. Simon, made 
the decision to discontinue the [single-price format] as a result 
of his judgment, based on his extensive experience in the 
market for Treasury securities, that the [single-price format] 
would bring in fewer dollars to the Treasury.”39
7.4 Removal of Restrictions
on When-Issued Trading
When-issued, or “WI,” trading is trading in an unissued 
security for settlement on the issue date. Beginning with the 
first note auction in 1970 and continuing until early 1975, the 
Treasury effectively precluded WI trading in notes and bonds 
prior to the close of bidding. Bidders were required to agree 
“not to buy or sell, or to make any agreements with respect to 
The failure of the August bond sale did not 
deter the Treasury from continuing to 
auction securities, but it did lead to some 
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the purchase or sale or other disposition of any [securities] of 
this issue at a specific rate or price, until [after the auction 
close].”40 The restriction continued a similar restriction on WI 
trading in connection with subscription offerings that dated 
back to 1940.41 The Treasury did not generally prohibit WI 
trading in bills prior to the close of an auction.
Market participants found pre-auction WI trading in bills 
useful for two reasons. First, public dissemination of the 
discount rate at which a new bill was trading in the WI market 
provided information about the market’s collective appraisal of 
the prospective value of the bill and enhanced the efficiency of 
the bidding process. A 1992 study (U.S. Treasury Department 
et al. 1992, p. A-6) pointed out that WI trading “reduces 
uncertainties surrounding Treasury auctions by serving as 
a price discovery mechanism. Potential . . . bidders look to 
when-issued trading levels as a market gauge of demand in 
determining how to bid at an auction.” Additionally, pre-
auction WI sales facilitated distribution of a bill. The 1992 study 
noted (p. 9) that WI trading “benefits the Treasury by . . . 
stretching out the actual distribution period for each issue.”
In early 1975, the Treasury removed the restriction on pre-
auction WI trading in notes and bonds in the course of revising 
its offering circulars to eliminate “obsolete” provisions.42 This 
was an important step in enhancing the efficiency of auction 
bidding and facilitating the distribution of new issues.43
8.C o n c l u s i o n
The Treasury’s success in institutionalizing regular auction 
sales of notes and bonds in the early 1970s was surprising. Two 
prior attempts, in 1935 and 1963, had failed and the third 
attempt came at a time when fixed-income securities prices had 
become more volatile. That the Treasury even made a third 
attempt testifies to the significance of Friedman’s (1960, 
pp. 64-5) criticism of fixed-price offerings. However, the two 
failed attempts demonstrated that the advantages of market-
driven auctions were not enough to guarantee that regular 
auction offerings would succeed: the process of moving from 
fixed-price offerings to auction sales also had to be managed 
carefully.
There were three important differences between the 
coupon-bearing securities auctions of the early 1970s and the 
1935 and 1963 auctions. First, the auctions of the early 1970s 
were closely patterned on the successful and familiar bill 
auctions and did not introduce any novel bidding rules (as in 
1963) or issuance patterns (as in 1935). This structure gave 
dealers a familiar base for developing their sales and risk 
management programs.
Second, auctions of coupon-bearing debt in the early 1970s 
were extended gradually to securities of increasing maturity 
and did not immediately offer long-term bonds. The extension 
gave dealers an opportunity to build up their risk management 
and sales programs gradually.
Finally, the Treasury was willing to modify the auction 
process when experience suggested that the existing structure 
could be improved. Most prominently, following the failure of 
the twenty-year bond auction in August 1973, the Treasury first 
began to delay announcement of the coupon rate on a new 
issue until closer to the auction day and then switched to a yield 
auction format. Similarly, in 1975, the Treasury removed the 
restriction on when-issued trading before an auction to 
enhance bidding efficiency and new-issue distribution.
In early 1975, the Treasury removed the 
restriction on pre-auction [when-issued] 
trading in notes and bonds . . . . This was 
an important step in enhancing the 
efficiency of auction bidding and 
facilitating the distribution of new issues.Endnotes
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new . . . issues and may, in fact, facilitate undesirable speculative 
activity in Treasury securities” (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Circular no. 8147, July 15, 1977). However, greater volatility of 
interest rates after October 1979 and a rapidly growing federal deficit 
led to renewed suggestions from the dealer community that pre-
auction WI trading would facilitate price discovery and new-issue 
distribution (author’s conversation with Mark Stalnecker, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance, 1981-82). The Treasury 
removed the restriction a second time in August 1981, characterizing 
it as “an unnecessary regulation which is believed to hinder the 
efficient adjustment of market prices to announcements of Treasury 
financing” (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no. 9128, 
August 17, 1981).References
44 The Institutionalization of Treasury Note and Bond Auctions 
Baker, C. 1976. “Auctioning Coupon-Bearing Securities: A Review 
of Recent Experience.” In Y. Amihud, ed., Bidding and 
Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation, 146-51. 
New York: New York University Press.
———. 1979. “The Basis and Practice of Treasury Debt 
Management.” In M. Dooley, H. Kaufman, and R. Lombra,
eds., The Political Economy of Policy-Making, 175-218. 
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Banyas, L. 1973. “New Techniques in Debt Management from the Late 
1950’s through 1966.” In Joint Treasury-Federal Reserve 
Study of the U.S. Government Securities Market, Staff 
Studies—Part 3. Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.
Boatler, R. 1975. “Treasury Bill Auction Procedures: An Empirical 
Investigation: Comment.” Journal of Finance 30, no. 3 (June): 
893-4.
Bolten, S. 1973. “Treasury Bill Auction Procedures: An Empirical 
Investigation.” Journal of Finance 28, no. 3 (June): 577-85.
———. 1975. “Reply.” Journal of Finance 30, no. 3 (June): 
900-1.
Carson, D. 1959. “Treasury Open Market Operations.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 41, no. 4 (November): 438-42.
Cecchetti, S. 1988. “The Case of the Negative Nominal Interest Rates: 
New Estimates of the Term Structure of Interest Rates during the 
Great Depression.” Journal of Political Economy 96, no. 6 
(December): 1111-41.
Chari, V., and R. Weber. 1992. “How the U.S. Treasury Should 
Auction Its Debt.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review 16, no. 4 (fall): 3-12.
Childs, C. 1947. Concerning U.S. Government Securities. 
Chicago, Ill.: C. F. Childs and Company.
Committee on Government Operations. 1956. “Debt Management 
Advisory Committees (Treasury Department).” Hearings 
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Government Operations. U.S. House of Representatives, 
84th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 5 and 7.
Eckstein, O., and J. Kareken. 1959. “A Background Memo on the Use 
of the Auction Technique for Marketing Treasury Securities.” 
Memorandum prepared for the Joint Economic Committee. 
Reprinted in Joint Economic Committee (1959a, pp. 1257-8).
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 1961. “The Longer She Stands the 
Shorter She Grows.” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Monthly 
Review, April: 2-5.
Friedman, M. 1960. A Program for Monetary Stability.
New York: Fordham University Press.
———. 1964. Comment on “Collusion in the Auction Market for 
Treasury Bills.” Journal of Political Economy 72, no. 5 
(October): 513-4.
Gaines, T. 1962. Techniques of Treasury Debt Management. 
Glencoe, Ill.: Columbia University Graduate School of Business 
Administration and the Free Press of Glencoe.
Goldstein, H. 1962. “The Friedman Proposal for Auctioning Treasury 
Bills.” Journal of Political Economy 70, no. 4 (August): 386-92.
Goldstein, H., and G. Kaufman. 1975. “Treasury Bill Auction 
Procedures: Comment.” Journal of Finance 30, no. 3 (June): 
895-9.
Hallowell, B., and K. Williamson. 1961. “Debt Management’s 
Contribution to Monetary Policy.” Review of Economics
and Statistics 43, no. 1 (February): 81-4.
Joint Economic Committee. 1959a. “Employment, Growth, and 
Price Levels, Part 6A—The Government’s Management of Its 
Monetary, Fiscal, and Debt Operations.” Hearings before 
the Joint Economic Committee. U.S. Congress, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess., July 24, 27, 28, 29, and 30.
———. 1959b. “Employment, Growth, and Price Levels, Part 9A— 
Constructive Suggestions.” Hearings before the Joint 
Economic Committee. U.S. Congress, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 
October 26-30.
Kaufman, H. 1973. “Federal Debt Management: An Economist’s 
View from the Marketplace.” In Issues in Federal Debt 
Management, 155-74. Boston, Mass.: Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston.References (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2004 45
Malvey, P., and C. Archibald. 1998. “Uniform-Price Auctions: Update 
of the Treasury Experience.” U.S. Treasury Department. Available 
at <http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-
management/auctions-study/upas2.pdf>.
Malvey, P., C. Archibald, and S. Flynn. 1995. “Uniform-Price Auctions: 
Evaluation of the Treasury Experience.” U.S. Treasury 
Department. Available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
domestic-finance/debt-management/auctions-study/final.pdf>.
Reinhart, V. 1992. “An Analysis of Potential Treasury Auction 
Techniques.” Federal Reserve Bulletin 78, no. 6 (June): 403-13.
Roosa, R. 1952. “Integrating Debt Management and Open Market 
Operations.” American Economic Review 42, no. 2 (May): 214-35.
Simon, D. 1994. “The Treasury’s Experiment with Single-Price 
Auctions in the Mid-1970s: Winner’s or Taxpayer’s Curse?” 
Review of Economics and Statistics 76, no. 4 (November): 
754-60.
Smith, V. 1966. “Bidding Theory and the Treasury Bill Auction: Does 
Price Discrimination Increase Bid Prices?” Review of Economics 
and Statistics 48, no. 2 (May): 141-6.
_____. 1967. “Experimental Studies of Discrimination versus 
Competition in Sealed-Bid Auction Markets.” Journal of 
Business 40, no. 1 (January): 56-84.
Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs. 1991. “The Activities of Salomon Brothers, Inc. 
in Treasury Bond Auctions.” Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. U.S. House of 
Representatives, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., September 11 and 12.
Tsao, C., and A. Vignola. 1977. “Price Discrimination and the 
Demand for Treasury’s Long-Term Securities.” Unpublished 
paper, U.S. Treasury Department.
U.S. Treasury Department. 1940. “Selling U.S. Government Direct and 
Guaranteed Issues by Tender.” Staff memorandum. Reprinted in 
Joint Economic Committee (1959a, pp. 1156-61).
———. 1959. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1958. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
———. 1960. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1959. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
———. 1972. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1972. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Treasury Department, Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1992. “Joint 
Report on the Government Securities Market.” Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
or the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides no warranty, express or implied, as to the 
accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for any particular purpose of any information contained in 
documents produced and provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in any form or manner whatsoever.